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The National Environmental Policy Act: 
A Review of Its Experience and Problems  
Daniel R. Mandelker  
INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Magna 
Carta of environmental law, requires all federal agencies to evaluate 
the environmental impacts of their actions, a duty that extends to 
state, local, and private entities when a federal link is present. Though 
followed by legislation that enacted massive duties to protect air, 
water, and other natural resources, NEPA remains a critical 
environmental law. This Article looks at major elements in NEPA’s 
implementation and the major contributions NEPA has made to 
environmental analysis. It reviews strengths and weaknesses and 
suggests where improvement can occur as NEPA moves forward as a 
protector of environmental values. The Article’s focus is on 
encouraging agencies to take a wider view of the environmental 
impacts they consider in a decision making process that is less 
confining than the process now in place. 
Part I begins the analysis by reviewing NEPA’s record as an 
environmental statute, noting achievements the statute has attained 
and criticisms it has attracted. Part II reviews the NEPA decision 
making process, assessing whether it has been effective as a means of 
carrying out NEPA’s environmental mandate. Part III considers how 
NEPA applies to agency projects as compared with agency plans and 
programs, and how NEPA’s effectiveness differs in these two 
settings. Part IV considers the “heart” of the environmental impact 
statement, the duty to consider alternatives to a proposed action, and 
how the courts have interpreted this requirement. Part V examines 
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agency duties to extend their environmental analysis beyond the 
proposal under review by considering its indirect impacts. Part VI 
concludes by asking, in view of this discussion, whether NEPA has 
met the environmental challenge the statute was intended to meet. 
I. CRITIQUING NEPA: WHAT HAS IT ACCOMPLISHED? 
NEPA was born in an era that had faith in bureaucratic 
comprehensive rationality, the idea that predictive analysis of a broad 
class of administrative decisions would produce rational decision 
making that would consider environmental impacts.
1
 This hope 
disappeared with the understanding that environmental systems are 
complex, dynamic, nonlinear, and mutually independent, making 
environmental prediction a much more difficult task. These 
complexities make the application of NEPA to actions and programs 
a much more difficult problem than initially expected. A statute and 
its regulations that assumed a more predictive and less complicated 
environment do not work well in an environment that has multiple 
ecological dimensions where change is not measured easily. 
The sections that follow consider issues in NEPA’s statutory and 
regulatory structure that demand attention and revision in light of this 
newer perspective on environmental management.
2
 This is an element 
in NEPA reform that has not received enough attention
3
 but that is 
critical to making NEPA a more effective statute. Evaluations of 
NEPA more commonly consider its effectiveness in getting agencies 
to incorporate environmental values into their decision making. This 
concern has brought forth a legion of studies.
4
 Most conclude that 
NEPA has had a moderately positive effect. This was the conclusion 
 
 1. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 393, 409–11 (1981); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
333, 344 (2004); William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA’s Insatiable Optimism, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,618, 10,620 (2009). 
 2. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Thoughts on NEPA at 40, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,640, 10,670 
(2009). 
 3. But see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002) (recommending a 
monitoring program for tracking the implementation of environmental impact statements). 
 4. For citations to the literature and discussion, see DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW 
& LITIGATION §§ 11:2–11:6 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter NEPA LAW]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/9
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in an early study of the Corps of Engineers and U.S. Forest Service, 
which remains the most careful and comprehensive review of 
NEPA’s influence on federal agencies.5  
Recent studies by the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), 
an Executive Office agency created by statute to administer NEPA 
and authorized by Executive Order to adopt regulations,
6
 have 
adopted a different perspective. CEQ accepted the challenge of 
NEPA’s performance and examined its effectiveness in carrying out 
the statutory mandate. Its first study was a review of NEPA’s 
effectiveness
7
 that considered some of the structural problems in 
NEPA’s application, such as the practice of agencies to avoid the 
preparation of environmental impact statements by finding that the 
environmental effects of an action are not significant because they 
can be mitigated.
8
 This is the mitigated Finding of No Significant 
Impact (“FONSI”), which agencies are claimed to adopt ninety 
percent of the time. This was not the expectation when NEPA was 
adopted, and the FONSI is an administrative alternative not included 
in the statute. 
CEQ later appointed a Task Force whose report comprehensively 
reviewed problems in NEPA’s implementation.9 The Report’s 
recommendations include six focus areas. Two of these, 
programmatic analysis and categorical exclusions, are considered in 
this Article.
10
 CEQ reviewed the Task Force recommendations, after 
which the then-Chair of CEQ issued a Memorandum with 
 
 5. SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK (1984) (attributing NEPA’s success 
or failure in modifying agency decision making to the autonomy and influence of 
environmental analysts in the federal agencies, the internal pressures that determined how the 
agencies reacted to environmental information, and the presence of interdependent internal and 
external pressures that encouraged compliance with NEPA). 
 6. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 
app. (2009). 
 7. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS (1997), http://ceq.hss.doe. 
gov/nepa/nepa25fn.pdf. 
 8. Id. at 19–20.  
 9. NEPA TASK FORCE, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, MODERNIZING NEPA 
IMPLEMENTATION (2003), http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/ntf/report/finalreport.pdf [hereinafter NEPA 
TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
 10. See id. at chs. 3 & 5. 
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suggestions for implementation.
11
 For the two issues this Article 
discusses, the Memorandum recommends the development of 
guidance but does not recommend structural changes that would 
change how these NEPA responsibilities are carried out.
12
 
Another criticism of NEPA is that the statute has been used to 
obstruct decisions by federal agencies by slowing down agency 
decision-making, with negative effects on the ability of agencies to 
carry out their statutory duties. These complaints prompted 
congressional intervention, most notably through statutes that revise 
and streamline NEPA procedures in legislation that applies only to 
individual federal programs. Legislation that applies to federally 
funded transportation projects is an example.
13
 This and similar 
legislation weakens NEPA’s environmental mandate by transferring 
decision-making authority to agencies responsible for their projects 
and by restricting judicial review of their decisions. 
These reviews of NEPA’s performance, together with statutory 
intervention to modify NEPA practice, suggest that an examination of 
the statute and its regulatory program is in order. Performance and 
obstruction problems may lie within the environmental review 
process the statute and its regulations have created. The sections that 
follow address several structural issues that affect the way in which 
NEPA’s environmental mandate has been carried out. 
II. THE NEPA DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
NEPA is a brief law
14
 that does not include a decision-making 
process. Neither are there clues on how the statute should be 
administered in its legislative history, which is also brief and unclear. 
 
 11. Memorandum from James L. Connaughton to Heads of Federal Agencies on 
Implementing Recommendations to Modernize NEPA (May 2, 2005), http://ceq.hss.gov/ntf/ 
CEQMemo_Implementing_Recommendations.pdf. For a discussion of the memorandum, see 
36 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1355, 1356 (2005).  
 12. For the adoption of categorical exclusions, for example, the Memorandum 
recommended methods to describe a category of actions, to substantiate that they do not 
environmental impacts, and to involve the public in making these decisions. Connaughton, 
supra note 11, at 4. 
 13. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, 
Pub. L. No. 109–59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections). 
 14. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/9
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A cryptic mandate, at the heart of the statute, requires a “detailed 
statement” on “major federal actions” that significantly affect the 
quality of the human environment.
15
 There is some indication that 
this requirement was expected to be self-serving, that agencies would 
decide on whether they complied, and that courts would not review 
this decision.
16
 This expectation was unfulfilled, and courts now play 
an active role in NEPA’s implementation. 
In the absence of detailed statutory direction, the key to 
compliance with NEPA lies in detailed regulations, adopted by CEQ, 
that specify how agencies should carry out NEPA’s statutory 
requirements. These regulations,
17
 almost the same as when they 
were adopted in 1978, create a three-part decision-making process for 
NEPA compliance that provides an elaborate framework for NEPA 
decision making. Experience has shown that this process is 
overelaborate, redundant, and not responsive to the needs in NEPA 
decision making. 
Under the first available option, agencies can designate actions 
that do not fall under NEPA at all. This is called a categorical 
exclusion, defined as “a category of actions which do not individually 
or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human 
environment.”18 If an action is not listed as a categorical exclusion, an 
agency has the option of proceeding immediately to the preparation 
of an environmental impact statement but is more likely to prepare an 
environmental assessment.
19
 Agencies are to use the preparation of 
this document to decide whether they need to prepare an 
environmental impact statement. An agency must prepare an impact 
 
 15. Id. § 4332(2)(C). The “detailed statement” requirement was added after testimony by 
the late Professor Lynton Caldwell in a congressional hearing, who asked for “action-forcing” 
language in the statute. It is not clear that the meaning of the phrase was understood. See NEPA 
LAW, supra note 4, § 2:2. Professor Caldwell is widely regarded as the author of the 
environmental impact statement requirement. 
 16. For a summary, see NEPA LAW, supra note 4, §§ 2:2–2:4. The treatise contains full 
citations to cases and periodicals on the issues considered in this Article. One of the author’s 
students years ago completed undergraduate work at a university in Washington, D.C. For a 
class paper, she wrote a history of NEPA based on congressional interviews. The explanation 
for NEPA’s adoption was a statement that the chair of the relevant committee was “asleep at the 
switch.” 
 17. 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (2008). 
 18. Id. § 1508.4. 
 19. Id. § 1508.9. 
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statement if it finds in its environmental assessment that the 
environmental impacts of its action are significant. CEQ regulations 
then specify what an environmental impact statement must contain.
20
 
Data are not available on the number of categorical exclusions 
prepared by agencies, though the number of judicial decisions 
suggests that agencies push this option to the limit, and a CEQ task 
force found that agencies were confused about their use.
21
 The 
avoidance problem is even more serious with environmental 
assessments, as the number of environmental assessments prepared is 
thought to outnumber environmental impact statements by a ratio of 
one hundred to one. Moreover, as noted earlier, agencies commonly 
adopt mitigation measures as part of their environmental assessment 
as a basis for a finding that significant impacts will not occur, a 
practice known as a mitigated FONSI. This practice has become the 
strategy of choice for NEPA compliance. It is not specifically 
authorized by the regulations but has been approved judicially.
22
 
What emerges from this discussion is a decision-making process, 
not mandated by statute, that is complicated and redundant, that 
includes a major compliance procedure not specifically authorized by 
the regulations, and that is subject to abuse. Redundancy occurs 
because the three compliance alternatives overlap. Each requires a 
significance determination that is key to the environmental analysis 
required by the statute. Categorical exclusions are designated because 
they are not significant actions, and a decision that an action can be 
categorically excluded must be reversed if its environmental impacts 
are found to be significant. The environmental assessment, 
sometimes referred to as a mini-impact statement, also determines 
whether an action is significant. If the action is not significant, an 
impact statement is not necessary. An environmental impact 
statement analyzes the environmental significance of the action it 
considers, and an agency can be reversed in court if the significance 
evaluation is not adequate.  
 
 20. Id. §§ 1502.10–1502.18. 
 21. NEPA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 57. See NEPA LAW, supra note 4, 
§§ 7:10–7:10.2. 
 22. NEPA LAW, § 8:57. For discussion of this practice see Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental 
Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/9
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A realignment of this decision-making process to eliminate 
redundancy and clarify agency responsibilities clearly is needed. 
Agencies can be required to define specifically the categorical 
exclusions they are allowed to make, an option many choose, and the 
question should be whether the action excluded can be significant 
under any circumstances in which it might arise. Whether a mitigated 
FONSI should be allowed as a method of NEPA compliance needs 
consideration. Questions concerning the adequacy of impact 
statement content also must be addressed, an issue considered for 
several important elements of the impact statement in the sections 
that follow.  
III. APPLYING NEPA TO AGENCY PLANS AND PROGRAMS 
A. How the Problem Has Been Addressed in Decisions, Regulations, 
and Statutes 
Many agencies are required to adopt plans that govern actions 
they take later to meet their statutory obligations. Forest management 
plans are an example. CEQ regulations define a “Major Federal 
Action” that is subject to NEPA to include both projects and plans,23 
but there are important differences in how NEPA can be applied 
effectively to each. A constant complaint is that NEPA’s application 
to individual projects is limited and reactive and does not consider 
the wider environment in which a project will be carried out. 
Consequently, NEPA analysis often is piecemeal and does not 
consider the larger environment in which agency actions occur. This 
problem is remedied to some extent by requirements that agencies 
must consider alternatives to their actions and their indirect and 
cumulative impacts, and must prepare program impact statements 
that consider related actions. These requirements are given some 
attention below, but are only a partial response.  
Applying NEPA directly to agency plans, as required by NEPA 
regulations, is the most effective way to require a broader review of 
the environmental impacts of agency actions that are covered by 
plans, but judicial decisions and legislation have limited this 
 
 23. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. 
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opportunity. One important type of plan governs federal funding for 
state and local government projects and provides the policies under 
which these projects are implemented. Regional agencies usually 
prepare these plans with federal assistance. State and regional 
transportation plans are an important example. Despite these links to 
federal funding and compliance, the Fifth Circuit in Atlanta Coalition 
on the Transportation Crisis, Inc. v. Atlanta Regional Commission
24
 
held NEPA did not apply to a long-range systems guide and land use 
plan the Commission adopted for the Atlanta metropolitan area. The 
plan made transportation projects eligible for federal funding, the 
federal agency reviewed and approved the plan, and federal funds 
were used in its preparation. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit held the 
federal presence was not so pervasive that NEPA applied. There was 
no federal substantive review of the regional plan, and possible 
federal funding for projects contained in the plan did not make it 
federal. Other cases have taken the same position,
25
 and Congress 
now has exempted decisions by the Secretary of Transportation on 
state and regional transportation plans from NEPA.
26
 
The obvious difficulty with court decisions and statutes exempting 
agency plans from NEPA review is that decisions made in these plans 
determine how the federal agency will make project funding 
decisions later, no matter how the court viewed the matter in Atlanta 
Coalition. NEPA still applies to individual projects when they are 
funded by federal assistance. Environmental review at that time can 
question siting and other decisions for projects that are included in a 
plan, but this is not the comprehensive review that would occur if the 
plan were covered by NEPA at the time it was adopted. 
Similar problems arise concerning forest management plans 
adopted under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(“FLPMA”), which authorizes their preparation.27 The Supreme 
Court substantially limited judicial review of forest management 
 
 24. 599 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Oliver A. Houck, How’d We Get Divorced? 
The Curious Case of NEPA and Planning, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,645, 10,647–48 (2009). 
 25. E.g., Bradley v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 658 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(concerning local redevelopment plan funded with federal community development assistance).  
 26. 23 U.S.C. §§ 134(p), 135(j) (2009) (emphasizing that impact statements are required 
on individual projects). 
 27. Federal Land Policy Management Act (“FLPMA”) 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/9
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plans by holding they are not decisions that are ripe for review under 
FLPMA,
28
 though the damage was mitigated by dictum suggesting 
these plans are nevertheless reviewable under NEPA.
29
 Some courts 
have accepted this dictum.
30
 Later, the Court held that courts will not 
usually enforce an agency plan because it is only a guide and does 
not generally prescribe specific actions.
31
 Though the approval of a 
plan is a major federal action that requires an impact statement, the 
Court held there is no further major federal action after a plan is 
approved that requires a supplemental impact statement under 
NEPA,
32
 though additional NEPA analysis would be required if a 
plan is amended or revised. Responding to these cases, the Forest 
Service issued a categorical exclusion that exempts forest plans, plan 
amendments, and plan revisions from NEPA.
33
 
Comprehensive environmental reviews of agency plans and 
programs under NEPA can be required even if there is no formal 
agency plan. This kind of review is done in a program impact 
statement, a term neither defined nor explained in CEQ regulations, 
though CEQ recognizes the need for this type of statement.
34
 The 
regulations authorize agencies, “[w]hen preparing statements on 
broad actions,” to evaluate related proposals together, such as 
proposals occurring “geographically . . . in the same general 
location.”35 This is an important option that can overcome myopic 
concentration on individual projects by allowing the comprehensive 
review of related projects in the same area. Highway projects 
concentrated in a metropolitan area are an example. 
 
 28. See Ohio Foresting Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 739 (1998).  
 29. Id. 
 30. For cases applying the NEPA dictum, see NEPA LAW, supra note 4, § 4:28 nn.47–48.  
 31. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 56 (2004). See also Michael C. 
Blumm & Sherry L. Bosse, Norton v. SUWA and the Unraveling of Federal Public Land 
Planning, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. &. POL’Y F. 105, 110 (2008). 
 32. CEQ regulations require preparation of a supplemental impact statement if there are 
new circumstances or information or if there is substantial change. NEPA LAW, supra note 4, 
§§ 10:49–10:52. 
 33. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing, Revising, 
or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,481 (Dec. 15, 
2006). 
 34. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(c). 
 35. Id. § 1502.4(c)(1).  
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Despite the availability of this option, the Supreme Court 
substantially limited it in Kleppe v. Sierra Club.
36
 The Department of 
the Interior had undertaken a Northern Great Plains resources 
program to assess the social, economic, and environmental impacts of 
resource development in five Great Plains states and also conducted 
two related studies. Plaintiffs claimed these three studies were a 
regional program that required the preparation of an impact 
statement. The Court disagreed, holding there had been no proposal 
for action on a regional scale and that preparing an impact statement 
would be impossible in the absence of a regional plan.
37
 The D.C. 
Circuit had held an impact statement was required because the 
regional plan and studies were attempts to control development in the 
region, but the Supreme Court again disagreed. It held that “the 
contemplation of a project and the accompanying study thereof do 
not necessarily result in a proposal for major federal action.”38 
Cases since Kleppe have interpreted it to hold that program impact 
statements were not necessary on a group of related activities. In 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, for example, the 
district court held an impact statement was not required on a 
feasibility study proposed by the agency in which it planned to 
evaluate the need for additional navigation works and locks on a 
waterway.
39
 Courts have required a program impact statement, 
however, when agencies have entered into formal programs.
40
 
B. Why Plans and Programs are Different from Projects 
The exemption of forest management plans from NEPA through a 
categorical exclusion is discouraging, but it raises the question 
whether the application of NEPA to agency plans presents different 
problems from its application to specific projects. This issue was 
reviewed comprehensively in an article by Stark Ackerman, who 
 
 36. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
 37. Id. at 401–02.  
 38. Id. at 406. 
 39. 501 F. Supp. 742, 750–51 (N.D. Miss. 1980). 
 40. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 435 F. Supp. 590, 598–602 (D. Or. 1977), 
aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Munro, 626 F.2d 134 (9th 
Cir. 1980). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/9
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discussed the problems that arise in the application of NEPA to forest 
management plans and questioned the effectiveness of NEPA 
compliance when these plans are reviewed under NEPA.
41
 He 
pointed out that forest plan decisions, unlike project decisions, are 
long-term programmatic decisions addressing dynamic conditions. 
He added: 
While forest plan decisions are made at a particular point in 
time, changes in the national forest resource base (such as 
catastrophic changes due to fire, weather, insect infestation, or 
disease), changes in economic conditions, or changes in public 
values can alter a key element of the forest plan decision. In 
addition, the experience in implementing a plan can identify 
the need to change the assumptions and projections made as 
part of the original NEPA analysis. Such changes or 
experience can result in an altered vision of the 
appropriateness of the forest plan decision, as well as the 
adequacy of the NEPA analysis that supports it.
42
 
 This is a key insight, and similar comments can be made about 
other agency plans, such as transportation plans. Ackerman asks 
whether NEPA can ever be effective as applied to forest planning and 
suggests that:  
 To be effective, the process must be more timely and final. 
This could be accomplished by streamlining the process to 
relax or remove some analysis standards, by shifting the 
emphasis from periodic large-scale forest plans to a more 
regular and continuous incremental decision making process, 
and by elevating major programmatic planning decisions to the 
political arena.
43
 
 These suggestions are reasonable and reflect the differences that 
arise when NEPA is applied to agency plans. A more flexible 
 
 41. Stark Ackerman, Observations on the Transformation of the Forest Service: The 
Effects of the National Environmental Policy Act on U.S. Forest Service Decision Making, 20 
ENVTL. L. 703 (1990). 
 42. Id. at 726 (citation omitted). 
 43. Id. at 731 (citations omitted). 
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application of NEPA’s requirements is necessary. Ackerman’s 
critique also calls into question the inflexible, one-time application of 
NEPA’s requirements that is mandated by requiring a choice among a 
categorical exclusion, an environmental assessment, or an 
environmental impact statement as the method of NEPA compliance. 
Which action should be taken to comply with NEPA when agencies 
prepare and implement agency plans will vary over time. 
IV. THE DUTY TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES 
NEPA places important analytic responsibilities on agencies that 
must be satisfied to comply with NEPA’s environmental mandate. 
One of the most important is the duty to consider alternatives to a 
proposed agency action in an environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement.
44
 The alternatives requirement is a 
major statutory innovation that was not part of agency statutory 
responsibilities prior to the adoption of NEPA.
45
 CEQ regulations 
refer to the alternatives requirement as the “heart” of the 
environmental impact statement.
46
 
The critical importance of the alternatives requirement was noted 
in the first landmark case on NEPA, Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating 
Commission, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.
47
 There, the 
D.C. Circuit held that the alternatives requirement “seeks to ensure 
that each agency decision maker has before him and takes into proper 
account all possible approaches to a particular project (including total 
abandonment of the project) which would alter the environmental 
impact . . . .”48 An example can illustrate. Assume a state 
transportation agency, with federal funding, proposes the 
 
 44. 43 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (2008) (“detailed statement on . . . alternatives to the 
proposed action”). A comparable requirement applies when an impact statement is not required. 
Id. § 4332(2)(E). 
 45. However, a year before NEPA, Congress adopted a statute allowing the Secretary of 
the Department of Transportation to consider alternatives for highway projects that affected 
parks, historic sites, and recreation and wildlife areas. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2008). An identical 
provision appears in the Federal Highway Act. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (2008). 
 46. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. See also Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 
472 F.2d 693, 697–98 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding that the alternatives requirement is a “linchpin” of 
the entire impact statement). 
 47. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 48. Id. at 1114. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/9
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construction of a new bypass highway around a city. Alternatives to 
this proposal include doing nothing, changing the location and width 
of the highway, or substituting nonhighway alternatives such as mass 
transit and access management that can improve traffic flow. These 
alternatives could mean eliminating the bypass project, keeping the 
project but changing its character, or eliminating the project but 
substituting another transportation alternative. The agency must 
discuss each alternative adequately in its environmental impact 
statement or assessment unless it believes an alternative is not 
relevant. This is an entirely new requirement. Nothing in land use 
law, for example, requires an applicant for a rezoning for a bakery to 
show that alternative locations exist that are preferable, or that the 
bakery should be built in a different manner. 
How extensive a discussion of alternatives must be, and what 
alternatives to an action or project must be discussed, are major 
questions, but there is a critical threshold issue that also requires 
close examination. CEQ regulations provide that impact statements 
must “briefly specify the underlying purpose and need to which the 
agency is responding in proposing the alternative including the 
proposed action.”49 A similar requirement applies to environmental 
assessments.
50
  
Courts have recognized that the purpose and need requirement is 
critical because it determines the universe of alternatives an agency 
must consider. Agencies can frame their purpose and need statements 
in a way that either broadens or narrows their alternatives analysis. In 
the bypass example described above, for example, the agency can 
narrow its discussion of alternatives by stating the purpose and need 
of the project as “providing an additional highway route around the 
city.” It can broaden the scope of its alternatives consideration by 
stating the purpose and need of the project as “improving 
transportation in the city’s metropolitan area.”51 
 
 49. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13 (2008). 
 50. Id. § 1508.9(b). 
 51. For a case recognizing the tension between an overly narrow and overly broad 
statement of purpose and need, see Citizens against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 
195 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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Courts recognize this tension in the purpose and need 
requirement. As the Tenth Circuit noted in Colorado Environmental 
Coalition v. Dombeck, some courts “have interpreted this 
[alternatives] requirement to preclude agencies from defining the 
objectives of their actions in terms so unreasonably narrow they can 
be accomplished by only one alternative (i.e., the applicant’s 
proposed project).”52 Yet the court cited other cases holding that 
agencies “also are precluded from completely ignoring a private 
applicant’s objectives” and concluded that there is no mutually 
exclusive conflict in these views.
53
 The conflict is there, however. In 
Dombeck, which considered the expansion of a ski resort, objectors 
wanted the sponsor to adopt a wilderness conservation objective, 
which the court found unnecessary. A forest plan for the area had 
previously prescribed additional recreational development for the 
forest and had designated the area in question for that development. 
Because of this planning policy, the court accepted a statement of 
purpose and need that limited expansion alternatives to those 
“designed to substantially meet the recreation development objectives 
of the Forest Plan.”54 Consideration of the wilderness objective was 
not required. A broader statement of purpose and need could have 
included the need for new development balanced against the need to 
consider wilderness objectives. 
Courts are also limited in reviewing purpose and need statements 
because agencies make them, and courts defer to their decisions 
under the rules governing judicial review of agency decisions. Most 
 
 52. 185 F.3d 1162, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 53. Id. at 1175.  
 54. Id.  
The Forest Service defined the needs of the proposal as:  
1. To respond to a proposal which has the potential for offering more effective 
recreation utilization of public lands without creating additional demands and impacts 
on off-site lands and communities.  
2. To help to achieve Forest Service goals by providing high quality recreation 
experiences for visitors to the National Forest, specifically within the Vail Ski Area 
special use permit area.  
3. To fulfill the broad management goals of the White River National Forest Land and 
Resource Management Plan.  
Id. at n.15. 
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cases uphold an agency’s statement of purpose and need.55 For this 
reason, encouraging agencies to look beyond project impacts in 
defining purpose and need may require new administrative guidance 
or possible statutory change. Legislation revising the NEPA process 
for transportation projects, for example, contains guidance on how to 
define purpose and need. It provides there must be a “clear 
statement” of objectives, which may include objectives identified in 
transportation plans.
56
 This statute requires the purpose and need 
statement to go beyond the immediate objectives of a project.  
V. THE DUTY TO CONSIDER INDIRECT IMPACTS
57
 
Agency responsibilities to consider environmental effects that lie 
beyond a project’s scope are also substantially affected by their duty 
to consider indirect effects. This responsibility is not widely noticed 
but has an important influence on the scope of analysis required in 
environmental reviews. Indirect effects “are caused by the action and 
are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still 
reasonably foreseeable.”58 CEQ regulations define “effects” to 
include growth-inducing effects.
59
 This is a causation test that, when 
properly applied, puts the agency in a forecasting role because it must 
consider the impact of its action on development in the surrounding 
area. 
A leading Ninth Circuit case, City of Davis v. Coleman,
60
 
illustrates this problem. A federally funded highway interchange was 
 
 55. NEPA LAW, supra note 4, § 9:23 nn.8, 14. 
 56. 23 U.S.C. § 139(f)(3)(A) (2005). However, the lead transportation agency has the 
responsibility to define purpose and need, a statutory directive that may preclude public input 
and judicial review. For commentary taking this position, see Jenna Musselman, Comment, 
SAFETEA-LU’s Environmental Streamlining: Missing Opportunities for Meaningful Reform, 
33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 825 (2006). For guidance on how transportation planning can shape the 
statement of purpose and need, see 23 C.F.R. pt. 450, App. A, ¶ 8 (2009). 
 57. There is a related duty to consider cumulative impacts, which are impacts similar and 
usually adjacent to or near the proposed action, but it is not clear whether this duty extends to 
planned actions that have not yet reached a proposal stage. See NEPA LAW, supra note 4, 
§§ 10:42–10:42.4. 
 58. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2009). 
 59. Effects are defined to include “growth inducing effects and other effects related to 
induced changes in the pattern of land use, population density or growth rate, and related effects 
on air and water and other natural systems, including ecosystems.” Id. 
 60. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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planned in a rural area near Davis, California, to create a demand for 
new industrial development in the area, partly stimulated by the 
presence of a University of California campus in the city. Meeting a 
demand for highway improvement was not a factor. The agency did 
not prepare an impact statement, and the Ninth Circuit reversed this 
decision because the agency did not discuss the inevitable new 
industrial growth and its expected impact: 
 The growth-inducing effects of the Kidwell Interchange 
project are its raison d’etre, and with growth will come 
growth’s problems: increased population, increased traffic, 
increased pollution, and increased demand for services such as 
utilities, education, police and fire protection, and recreational 
facilities.
61
  
 A number of environmental problems were implicated. The local 
water supply would be affected. It would not last indefinitely, and its 
depletion would affect groundwater levels. A growth management 
program adopted by the city would be another casualty. New 
industrial development near the interchange would disproportionately 
increase the city’s population, aggravate a housing shortage, create 
urban sprawl, and increase the demand for city services. Yet the city 
could not tax any of this development, as it was outside city limits. 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected an argument that the uncertainty of 
development in the area made the “secondary” effects of the 
interchange too speculative to consider.
62
 Uncertainty about the pace 
and direction of development merely indicated the need for exploring 
alternate possibilities. These would be based on external 
contingencies that would influence the development that would 
occur. 
Forecasting growth and development expected to occur because of 
investments in highways and other public facilities is normally 
carried out as part of the comprehensive planning process 
municipalities typically undertake. City of Davis thus requires an 
evaluation under NEPA of the growth impacts of public development 
but not the adoption of policies that can manage that growth, which is 
 
 61. Id. at 675. 
 62. Id. at 676.  
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beyond NEPA’s scope. Local governments can adopt these policies, 
and state statutes require planning in California, where the City of 
Davis case arose.
63
 
A later Ninth Circuit case, also from California, illustrates the 
interplay between local plans and the duty to consider indirect 
impacts under NEPA. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Department 
of Transportation
64
 considered the realignment of a state highway in 
Carmel. A combined environmental impact statement under NEPA 
and environmental impact report under the counterpart California 
statute selected an alternate route in a nearby canyon. Carmel 
challenged the combined statements and objected, in part, to the 
analysis of growth-inducing effects. It relied on the CEQ regulation 
and City of Davis, but the Ninth Circuit held the agencies had 
properly considered the growth-inducing effects of the highway. It 
concluded “[t]he construction of the Hatton Canyon freeway will not 
spur on any unintended or, more importantly, unaccounted for, 
development because local officials have already planned for the 
future use of the land, under the assumption that the Hatton Canyon 
Freeway would be completed.”65 Though some new development 
might occur, it was planned and accounted for in the Carmel Valley 
Master Plan. “No further analysis is warranted.”66 
The implications of this case for NEPA practice are considerable. 
A requirement to consider the indirect effects of agency projects 
widens the scope of the NEPA inquiry to include effects that occur 
beyond the project. This requirement has the same effect 
geographically as the requirement to consider alternatives in 
requiring the consideration of alternative project options. Considering 
the indirect effects of public improvement projects such as highways, 
however, transforms the NEPA analysis into a planning exercise in 
which the impacts of the project are considered but planning policies 
cannot be adopted or implemented. Reliance on local plans can 
 
 63. Planning is mandatory in California. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65,583 (Deering 2009).  
 64. 123 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 65. Id. at 1162. 
 66. Id. at 1163. The Ninth Circuit also relied on a CEQ regulation authorizing cooperation 
with state and local agencies. Id. at 1162. However, the only reference to local plans in the 
regulations is a requirement to discuss inconsistencies with local plans. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.2(d) 
(2009).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
310 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 32:293 
 
 
remedy this problem, but local plans can be inadequate or even 
exclusionary and not appropriate as part of a NEPA review.
67
 
The Carmel case accepted the development policies included in 
the local plan, but federal agencies may not be as accepting. They 
may want to evaluate the content and policies of local plans before 
deferring to them as the basis for a NEPA evaluation. Regional plans 
may be entitled to greater weight. Whether policies adopted in 
comprehensive plans should even govern decisions in NEPA analysis 
is another question. More attention to this problem is necessary in 
NEPA regulations or perhaps in statutory amendments. 
Similar problems arise at the state level, where state statutory 
counterparts to NEPA apply to local planning and zoning decisions in 
some states. The difficulty there is that land development projects 
may require both environmental reviews and review under local land 
use regulations, and the two regimes may have different purposes and 
requirements. Unnecessary duplication can occur. A rezoning for a 
new commercial development, for example, may require review 
under local land use regulations and review under the state’s 
counterpart to NEPA, which will cover most of the same issues. 
The author examined these problems as part of a project by the 
American Planning Association that proposed new model planning 
and zoning legislation. The model legislation includes a proposal to 
integrate review under land use regulations with review under state 
NEPA counterparts.
68
 The proposal recommends three alternatives 
for dealing with this problem. One alternative that could be useful in 
the NEPA process would evaluate the environmental effects of the 
land use, housing, transportation, and community facilities elements 
of a comprehensive plan when the plan is adopted.
69
 If this analysis is 
 
 67. The courts have properly rejected the use of exclusionary zoning to exclude 
government housing projects. See NEPA LAW, supra note 4, § 8:55. 
 68. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Melding State Environmental Policy Acts with Land-Use 
Planning and Regulations, 49 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Mar. 1997, at 3 (discussing the 
problem and suggesting statutory changes). Model legislation that incorporates alternatives for 
dealing with this problem is in Chapter 12 of AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, GROWING 
SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF 
CHANGE (Stuart Meck ed., 2002). 
 69. The other two options are to prepare an environmental impact statement on a 
comprehensive plan or to include environmental requirements in local comprehensive plans and 
land development regulations. 
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done adequately at the local level, and if growth policies in the local 
plan are acceptable, the plan could support the NEPA evaluation of 
growth-inducing effects that is required by the indirect effects 
regulation.
70
 
CONCLUSION 
NEPA’s environmental full disclosure requirement was intended 
as a wake-up call to federal agencies to add environmental values to 
their decision making. The intent was that decision-making 
procedures based on a narrow agency mission focus often neglected 
environmental concerns and would now be widened to take these 
concerns into account. The problem is that difficulties in the 
implementation of the statute have limited the achievement of this 
objective. 
One problem is the complex and overlapping set of procedures 
through which agencies decide whether an environmental impact 
statement must be prepared. These procedures are redundant. They 
complicate agency compliance because often it is not clear how 
agencies should proceed, and agencies use the preparation of 
categorical exclusions and environmental assessments to avoid the 
duty to prepare the full impact statement contemplated by NEPA. 
The statutory limitation of NEPA to agency “actions” has limited 
the scope of the statute to individual agency decisions and projects, 
and prevented its application in a wider context where environmental 
values can be considered over a broader landscape. This Article 
reviewed three examples of this narrowing. One is the limited extent 
to which NEPA applies to agency plans as compared with agency 
projects. The exclusion of transportation plans, which set major 
policies for growth and development for states and regions, is 
especially disturbing. Analysis of plans may require different analytic 
 
 70. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors of County of Santa Barbara, 801 P.2d 
1161 (Cal. 1990). The Supreme Court of California held that in evaluating alternatives to a 
hotel shorefront development, the agency could rely on the comprehensive plan, which had 
considered the alternative sites available. The court held that an environmental report “is not 
ordinarily an occasion for the reconsideration or overhaul of fundamental land use policy.” Id. 
at 1173. 
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techniques and a different perspective but is essential to NEPA’s 
effectiveness. 
Statements of purpose and need that determine the scope of 
alternatives analysis are an overlooked but critical part of NEPA 
compliance. Agencies have this responsibility, but it will narrow the 
scope of NEPA review if agencies describe purpose and need so that 
only the preferred project is identified. Whether a new highway is 
described as a project to remedy traffic congestion or a project to 
meet regional transportation needs, for example, will determine how 
wide a NEPA analysis should reach. Reliance on the statement of 
goals and policies in comprehensive plans can help avoid 
nearsightedness in the purpose and need statement, especially if the 
plan has been adopted at the state or regional level. 
Agencies must also consider the indirect impacts of their actions. 
This is a causation requirement, and requires agencies to consider the 
environmental effects of development that may occur in the future 
that are caused by their actions. Growth and development triggered 
by a new highway interchange is an example. Consideration of 
growth-inducing effects requires agencies doing NEPA analysis to 
undertake the forecasting task of comprehensive planning because 
they must forecast a project’s growth-inducing effects, but they 
cannot adopt policies to manage that growth. Linkage with local 
plans may provide an answer to this problem. 
NEPA is a major environmental statute that has contributed its 
weight to the protection of the environment. Attention to 
implementation and structural problems that determine NEPA’s reach 
and effectiveness will make its promise of environmental disclosure 
more effective. 
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